# AN IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF THE Preſent Troubles of *Germany*, THE Conduct of the GENERALS now in the FIELD, And particularly of the Late BATTLE of *DETTINGEN*: As alſo of the PRESENT PLAN of POLITICKS OF THE Emperor and Queen of *Hungary*, and their AUXILIARIES. IN A LETTER FROM A MEMBER of the DIET at *Ratisbon*, TO A PUBLICK MINISTER at the *Hague*, Dated the 4th of JULY, N. S. 1743.

Tranſlated from the Original *French*.

*LONDON:*
Printed for M. COOPER, in *Pater-noſter Row*, 1743.

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# AN IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF THE Present Troubles of Germany, THE Conduct of the GENERALS now in the FIELD, And particularly of the Late BATTLE of DETTINGEN: As also of the PRESENT PLAN of POLITICKS OF THE Emperor and Queen of Hungary, and their AUXILIARIES.



IN A LETTER FROM A MEMBER of the DIET at Ratisbon, TO A PUBLICK MINISTER at the Hague, Dated the 4th of July, N. S. 1743.

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*Ratisbon*, 4th *July*, 1743.

SIR,

IF we at *Ratisbon* be nearer the Scene of War, you at the *Hague* are certainly much nearer that of Politicks, and conſequently better able to inform us on the Banks of the *Danube*, of the Conduct of the active Courts of *Europe*, than we can poſſibly be to give you in *Holland*, any new Lights on ſo trite a Subject: But ſince you inſiſt I ſhould blend my Thoughts of the political Conduct of the *Imperial* and *Auſtrian* Auxiliaries, with what I may think of that of their Generals in the Field, I ſhall endeavour to obey you at the Hazard of expoſing my Ignorance; for I had much rather be thought a weak Stateſman than a lukewarm Friend.

When I ſay I hazard the expoſing my Ignorance in complying with your Deſire, I would have it underſtood, that, I mean in expreſſing myſelf diſtinctly and clearly; for as for Matter and Obſervation, I pretend to no more than ecchoing to you the Senſe of

all the publick Miniſters here. The Commotions at our Door, and the unſettled State of the Empire in general, leave us but too much Room for Speculation, the Offspring of *Leiſure*, of which, we who compoſe the *Diet*, have had more than we deſired ever ſince the Election of the Head of this Mighty Body.

The *Germanick* is moſt certainly a powerful or mighty Body, taken collectively; but paſt, and particularly preſent Experience may convince us, that it may be debilitated ſo as to receive Laws from an inferior Power. This muſt proceed from Defects in the original Conſtitution of the Empire, among which that of veſting, or rather permitting many of its Members to enjoy abſolute Sovereignty is not the leaſt. All the Advantages gain'd of the Empire by its Neighbours, were owing to this Cauſe, ſo were all the Convulſions that have happened in its Bowels, not excepting the preſent diſtructive Broils.

The Ambition of the Houſe of *Bavaria* and Intrigues of *France*, were alone inſufficient to kindle up ſuch a Flame as we have ſeen ſince the Death of *Charles* VI. if ſome of the principal, I may ſay independant Members of this great Body, had not found, or thought to have found their Intereſt in the Diſcord and Confuſions of their Country. If *Pr——a* had been more dependant; had ſhe been leſs abſolute, ſhe would have been in no Condition to give ſuch early Diſturbance to the Body of which ſhe was but a Part:

Part: And had *H——r* been kept in her original Subordination, her Ambition to extend her Limits and encreaſe her Power, had not been ſo fatal to *Europe* in general, and *Germany* in particular, as it has been known to be ſince the laſt general Peace.

If the Emperor *Leopold* had conſulted the Intereſt of the Empire; nay, had he regarded that of his own Houſe, he had never conſented to an Increaſe of the Electoral Dignity. But why ſhall we wonder at the Errors of that weak Prince, when we reflect that ſo conſummate a Stateſman as the late King *W——m*, was no leſs fallible in having been the Means of *Leopold*'s acting ſo impolitickly.

The Annals of King *W——m* paint him both Wiſe and Valiant, they produce him as excelling in the Cabinet and Field. I won't enter into a formal Diſpute with the Panegyriſts of a Prince who was, without any doubt, the luckieſt of his Time: For, with the Majority of Mankind, *Luck* includes not only Wiſdom and Valour, but all other Virtues and Endowments. He might be a good Officer tho' unfortunate; and may be a good Stateſman tho' not infallible. That he was not infallible is certain, ſince it is now notorious, that he was overſeen in two of the moſt eſſential Actions of his Life; I mean the *Partition Treaty*, and the Elevation of the Houſe of *H——r*. By the firſt, he undeſignedly paved the Way of the Houſe of

*Bourbon* to the Crown of *Spain*; and by the ſecond, as undeſignedly paved the Way for an Increaſe of the Power of *France*, a Decreaſe of that of the Houſe of *Auſtria* and *Great Britain*, and for weak'ning the Props that ſupport a Ballance of Power in *Europe*, on which he ſeemed to fix his Views and Heart.

'Tis thought that a pungent Regret for having been over-reach'd in the *Partition Treaty*, had ſhorten'd that Great Man's Days; but had he lived to ſee what has happened in Conſequence of ſome other of his Meaſures, I don't think his Concern would have decreas'd.

'Tis ſcarce doubtful that King *W——m* intended an Increaſe of the *Germanick* Power, the better to curb the Ambition of *France*, when he projected the Settlement of the Crown he wore on a Prince of the Houſe of *H——r*; nor is it leſs dubious, notwithſtanding the Suggeſtions of many Writers, that he had the future Happineſs of his Subjects in View. But let us be allowed to ſay, that however that Great Man may have been inclined; however he may have intended, it now appears but too evidently, that he might have taken other Steps, which would have conducted with leſs Uncertainty to the glorious Ends which his Panegyriſts ſay he had in View.

His Partizans may, if they pleaſe, inſiſt upon the Rectitude of his Meaſures; but without

without refining on his Politicks, or ſifting his Intentions, was it not obvious that a powerful Crown would inſpire a *German* Prince with Ambition, the which would naturally be attended with a ſtrong Deſire of inriching and extending the Limits of his Hereditary Dominions, and of acquiring Power, and making a Figure in his native Country? Was it not likewiſe evident, that all Acquiſitions to the Family-Eſtate muſt be at the Expence of the Crown intailed; and that, as every Acquiſition of Power in *Germany*, muſt be in ſome Meaſure at the Expence of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, all Enlargement of Territory, or Power on the Side of *H——r*, muſt not only weaken that Houſe, but raiſe ſuch a Spirit of Jealouſy and Suſpicion among the Members of the *Germanick* Body, as would anſwer the Views of *France*, and endanger the Ballance of Power?

*Louis* XIV. the moſt penetrating Prince of his Time, foreſaw the Conſequences, not only of the *Partition*, but of the *Settlement* of the *B——h* Crown, and far from obſtructing either, powerfully, tho' ſecretly, promoted the latter, and projected the former. Nay, ſome go ſo far, as to impute the firſt favourable Impreſſions concerning the Houſe of *H——r*, to the Policy of the Cabinet of *Verſailles*: But be that as it will, I don't think that any thing of Conſequence has happened either in *Germany* or *Britain*, ſince the Acceſſion, but what might have been foreſeen

foreſeen when the Act of Settlement was under Conſideration.

'Tis eaſy, you will ſay, to deduce Arguments from paſt Facts, and conſequently to raiſe Objections to the Rectitude of paſt Conduct. But pray, my dear Friend, can there be any Neceſſity for having Recourſe to the *paſt*, in order to judge of the Expediency of thoſe Meaſures we are examining? The political Impropriety of the *Partition Treaty*, ſtares one full in the Face (*ſate aux yieux*) nor need one be a *Machiavel*, to ſee that *France* would be courted by the new Family as ſoon as the Succeſſion ſhould take Place, ſuch an Ally being neceſſary to awe the Head of the Empire, who would not, without Jealouſy, ſee any conſiderable Enlargement of Power and Territory in the Empire by a Proteſtant Elector.

'Tis true, the *Engliſh*, who are painted by ſome, to be more wiſe than ſteady, concurr'd with their King; but was it out of Deference to his Judgment, or to acquire his Favour? They are much belied, or many of them foreſaw what has happened ſince the Acceſſion, but the Influence of the Court—The Concurrence of that People is no Proof to me of the Rectitude of the Meaſure; for I have obſerved them concurring ever ſince the *Acceſſion*, in many Meaſures that were certainly diſadvantageous to their Country. Tho' I mention the *Engliſh* Nation in general, yet I mean their Repreſentatives in their Parliaments

Parliaments or Senates, who may be call'd the Nation without Impropriety, as they not only repreſent the whole People, but conclude them by their Acts. In what Light then will the Concurrence of that Nation appear, if we examine their Conduct ſince the Death of the laſt Monarch of the *Stuart* Race?

If the Situation of *Europe*, at the Death of Queen *Ann*, be duly conſidered, the Conduct of the Court of *London*, and Concurrence of the *B——h* P———ts, will be thought extremely myſterious, if not contradictory to all who diſtinguiſh not the ſeparate Intereſts of *Great Britain* and *Hanover*. But with this Clue one may very ſafely reckon upon arriving at the Port of true Knowledge. One may eaſily trace this favourite *H——n* Intereſt down from the Year 1714 to the preſent Hour. It appears not more evidently in the Purchaſe of *Bremen* and *Verden*, and the War with *Sweden*, to gratify and induce *Denmark* to part with her Conqueſts, than in the ſubſequent War with *Ruſſia*, to induce *Sweden* to ratify the Sale. It does not appear leſs evidently in the unnatural Alliances contracted with *France*, than in the Slights and Indignities put upon the late Head of the Empire; nor was it more conſpicuous by the Neutrality of *England* and *Hanover*, during the late War, on Account of the Election of *Poland*, than it is even now,

now, when the Armies of *England* and *Hanover* are in the Heart of the Empire.

I don't know how your Sages at the *Hague* had reaſoned on the March of thoſe Troops into *Germany*, but here, at *Ratisbon*, we looked upon it as an undigeſted Meaſure owing partly to Neceſſity, partly to an Over-Cautioneſs, or rather Over-Tenderneſs for the dear E———e, and partly to the Craft of the new *Engliſh* Miniſtry, and the falſe Ambition of a certain P——e, who would be thought a great Captain. The Clamour in *England*, on Account of the Partiality of the Bargain for the Troops of *H——r*; and for that theſe *German* Mercenaries could not act againſt the Head of the Empire, made it neceſſary to march them ſomewhere out of the *Netherlands*, where the *Dutch* would very unwillingly ſee the War break out. To lay then the Clamour of the *Engliſh* Nation, to give ſome Colour of an Intention of ſupporting the Queen of *Hungary*, and to give Eaſe to the Scruples of the *Dutch*, it was neceſſary to march the Troops out of the *Netherlands*; and whither muſt they have gone, but croſs the *Rhine*, if it was intended they ſhould ſerve for Parade only?

Here then appears very evidently the Neceſſity of marching the Troops out of the *Netherlands*; but it ſeems no leſs evident, that by marching them croſs the *Rhine*, it was not intended to come to Blows with *France*. Nor does the late Action at *Dettingen*, weaken

ken this Suppoſition, or if it ſhould, it would prove the Generals of the Queen of *Hungary*'s Auxiliaries to be as unskilful as the Stateſmen of a certain powerful Iſland were unfaithful to their own Country, in order to enlarge and enrich a foreign Territory.

Was it not the particular *Intereſt* of this Territory which with-held the Power and Reſentment of *England*, as ſoon as the ambitious Intentions of *Pruſſia*, *Bavaria* and *France* were made manifeſt? Was it not that particular *Intereſt* which produced the Neutrality for *H——r*, and the Vote of that E———e in Favour of his preſent Imperial Majeſty? The Houſe of *Auſtria* was too Great for *H——r*, tho' not for *England*; and therefore, tho' it was the Intereſt of that Crown, that the Imperial Dignity ſhould continue in the Houſe of *Auſtria*, the Vote was given to a Prince of another Houſe, as being more immediately for the Intereſt of *H——r*, that he ſhould be elected.

The Partizans of the Houſe of *H——r* don't attempt juſtifying the Vote to the Elector of *Bavaria*, on any other Footing than that of Neceſſity, occaſioned by the March of Marſhal *Mallebois*: But herein they are miſtaken; for the Promiſe of the Vote was made to the late Cardinal *Fleury* before *Mallebois* left *Paris*: But, ſuppoſing the March of *Mallebois*'s Army to have intimidated, why was not the Court of *London*

as early in Preparations as that of *Verſailles*? Why did not *H——r* take early Care of herſelf? The World is groſly miſtaken, or there was no want of Treaſure at *H——r*; and 'tis equally well known that Money will ſoon raiſe Armies in *Germany*; I may ſay inſtantly.

But it would not anſwer the particular Purpoſes of the E———e to have acted otherwiſe. It was reſolved to bring down the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and, therefore, to have an Emperor of another Houſe: But this could not be done with any colourable Grace, unleſs it ſhould appear compulſary. This muſt have been the true Reaſon for that memorable Vote, or a worſe; I mean a Reaſon which would much worſe bear the Light.

Let what will be the Motive for that extraordinary Vote, 'tis certain it has been attended with evil Conſequences, with regard to the Houſe of *Auſtria* and the Balance of Power. A ſingle Negative in the Electoral College, might give a Colour for a new Election, which probably would fall on the *Grand Duke*; and which the preſent Emperor might not very ſtrenuouſly oppoſe, ſhould he fail of an Increaſe of Territory, which was his principal View in ſoliciting the Diadem.

In giving the Vote, all Excuſe for future Oppoſition was cut off. What Colour can a *German* Prince have for oppoſing a Head of the Empire whom he himſelf had choſen?

And

And ſhould he be put into the *Ban* of the Empire for his Oppoſition, would it be an Injuſtice? 'Tis happy for a certain Elector, as Matters have lately fallen out, that the Emperor is impotent of Power. But ſhould the War continue, there is no knowing where Power may be fixed. As Matters ſtand at preſent, the Scene of Action is like to be transferred from the *Danube*, the *Mayn* and *Neckar*, to the *Moſelle*, *Maeſe* and *Scheld*: For *France* ſeems determined to take away all Excuſe from the Court of *Vienna*, for continuing the War againſt the Emperor, by withdrawing her Troops from *Bavaria*; and from the Empire, if that will give Content to the too ſanguine Allies of her *Hungarian* Majeſty. And what may be the Conſequences of a War, wherein *France* need, for ſome Time at leaſt, be but on the Defenſive only; or where Power would be fixed after ſuch a Conflict, is beyond all human Knowledge. But if Experience be a faithful Guide, there is a ſtrong Probability that *France* would come no loſer, and that the Heireſs of *Auſtria* would come no Gainer out of ſuch a War.

However impolitick it may ſeem for the Queen of *Hungary* and her Ally in the Field, to meditate an offenſive War againſt *France*; and however unlikely it be that theſe Powers ſhould form any Hopes of Succeſs in ſo unequal a Conflict, yet the late Action at *Dettingen*, ſhews but too evidently that *France*

has Proof of ſuch an offenſive Alliance: For, conſidering that Marſhal *Noailles* muſt have known the Intentions of his Court as to the Evacuation of *Bavaria*, and thereby removing the main Obſtacle that ſeemed hitherto to obſtruct Peace between the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*, 'tis not probable that he would risk his Men in attacking the combined Army, if there had not been Proof of an offenſive Alliance againſt *France* ſingly: But before I proceed in my Obſervations on ſuch Alliance, or the Motives of it, you won't be diſpleaſed that I give you a ſuccinct, but genuine Account of that Action, which has been ſo variouſly reported by even thoſe who ought, by their high Rank, to be above Miſrepreſentation. Don't however expect a military prejudiced Detail of that ſharp Combat; but, rather, ſuch an Account as may be looked for from one well informed, and no Enemy to either Side, but no Soldier.

Tho' it ſeems to be evident, that there was no Intention of acting offenſively in the Empire, againſt its Head, with the mercenary Troops of *Hanover* and *Heſſe*, when they were taken into the Pay of *England*, but rather, that they were to act againſt *France* in *Flanders*; yet is it likely that the ſucceeding bad Succeſs of the Emperor in *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*, and the Clamour in *England* againſt theſe Mercenaries, had altered the firſt Plan of the Court of *L——n*. The Emperor's growing Diſability to be revenged of *H—r*, gave

gave freſh Courage to the Auxiliary of *Hungary* to march at laſt into the Empire, tho' 'tis probable there was as yet no fix'd Reſolution to act offenſively; but had any Share of Succeſs attended the Imperial Arms on the *Danube* and *Moldaw*, the Mercenaries in the *Engliſh* Pay had never been ventured to the *Mayn*, or even beyond the *Rhine*.

As a Proof that, when the combined Army paſſed the *Rhine*, it was not intended to march up as far as the *Mayn*, much leſs higher into *Germany*, we find no Magazines, no Proviſion of any kind, ſecured for the March or Subſiſtance of ſo large a Body of Forces. If this be no Proof of an Intention not to march ſo far as the *Mayn*, it is certainly one of either the too great Parſimony or Unskilfulneſs of the Leaders. This appears evidently from the Conſequence; for never was an Army, unemploy'd in Sieges, or any other Military Operation of Difficulty, ſo diſtitute of all the Neceſſaries of Life, as was that of the combin'd Army for near fifteen Days before the Affair of *Dettingen*. I muſt obſerve then from hence, that the Conduct of the Leaders is not as much to be applauded as the Bravery of the Troops; nor did this ſeem to appear more before than on the very Day of Action.

The Miſtakes of the Generals of the combin'd Army appear to have been very early. Their paſſing the *Mayn* was condemned, becauſe, if they had not repaſſed it precipitately,

ly, they risked the being attacked by a ſuperior Army; or, if they ſhould not, they muſt inevitably find themſelves in Want of Proviſions: But the Reaſon aſſerted for repaſſing that River ſeems to wear a worſe Face, if poſſible, than the firſt Paſſing. 'Tis ſaid, the Repaſſing was for Want of Artillery: A good, ſubſtantial Reaſon without all Doubt! But who obliged them to paſs without Artillery? or, what was become of it? or, why did it not paſs along with the Troops? From this firſt extraordinary Motion of the combin'd Army, no great Matters were expected by us here from the Skill of its Chiefs, nor hitherto have we been miſtaken.

To attone then for the firſt Error of paſſing the *Mayn*, when it was evident there was no Safety in continuing on this Side of it, 'tis thought a ſecond was committed in taking Poſt ſo high as *Aſchaffenberg*, without firſt ſecuring the Navigation of the River ten or fifteen Miles higher, which might have been done with Eaſe; but, as if the Commanders had look'd upon the Navigation of that River as a Matter of no Conſequence, they neglected it from its Source to the *Rhine*, 'tis hard to gueſs why ſo groſs a Neglect was committed; or, when it was, why the Army was detain'd ſo many Days in a Camp, when all Probability of being ſupplied was vaniſhed, without paſſing the River, and hazarding a general Engagement with a ſuperior Army.

'Tis a Myſtery why the combin'd Army would proceed ſo high as the *Mayn* before it ſhould

ſhould be compleat. The Body of *Heſſians* and *Hanoverians*, marching to join, was too conſiderable a Corps to be neglected: But all the Operations of the combined Army before the Battle of *Dettingen*, ſeem to be clouded and myſterious. There ſeems to have been no *Marlborough*, or *Eugene* at their Councils of War. I ſhall examine preſently what might be the Motives for the Commiſſion of ſuch a Series of Miſtakes as appear here to have been committed from the paſſing the *Rhine* to the Action of the 27th, of which the following is pretty near the Relation, which is look'd upon here as the moſt candid.

Some affect to give out, that the March from *Aſchaffenberg* was to prevent M. *Noailles* from cutting off the Corps of *Hanoverians* and *Heſſians* on their March to the Army: But the Truth is, the Scarcity was ſuch, that the combin'd Army muſt neceſſarily retire, or force their Way over the River, and diſlodge the *French* from the great Plenty they enjoy'd. M. *Noailles* knew their Wants, and had no other View than taking their Baggage to diſtreſs them the more, or to fall upon their Rear, as they ſhould be obliged to retreat towards *Hanau*. He took his Meaſures, and laid his Bridges, the 15th of *June* in the Evening, and paſſed about 23,000 of his Army early the next Morning.

Tho' all this was tranſacted in the very Neighbourhood of *Aſchaffenberg*, yet was it Six the 27th in the Morning before they were per-

perceived, nor was it but by pure Hazard that the Motions of the *French* were known. Had it not been for the cautious Curioſity of a private Gentleman (a Captain of a Company in the *Britiſh* Forces) the March of the *French* Detachment had not, in all Probability, been known 'till it appeared in Sight of the whole Army. M. *Noailles* had better Intelligence; for he knew it was reſolved, that the combin'd Army ſhould decamp the 26th early at Night; but, from a Confuſion incident to a Multiplicity of Commanders, or to Want of Experience or Order, it did not begin to move till about Three of the 27th in the Morning. Happy Confuſion! for, had there been none to obſtruct the Deſign of moving off at eleven at Night, M. *Noailles* had infallibly come up Time enough to have fallen on the Baggage and Rear; but, by the Delay, the Front of the combined Forces was got no farther than where the Rear would have been, if they had moved off in the Night, as was intended. Let us, however, call this Piece of good Luck by its true Name; let us not impute that to Conduct which is ſolely owing to Chance.

This fortuitous Intelligence of the Motions of the *French* Detachment, gave an Opportunity to the combined Army to form and draw up in Order of Battle; and without any Doubt, there was no Advantages that could be uſeful, but there was Time enough for taking: And if all ſuch Advantages were not taken, let it not be imputed to Want of Time,

but

but rather to Want of ſomewhat elſe, a Want of which appeared but too viſibly throughout the whole Action. The combined Army then being form'd, I won't ſay as advantageouſly as it might, M. *Noailles*, one would think had nothing more to do than to repaſs the *Mayn*; for, without any Diſpute, 23,000 Men, however choſen and ſelected, were no Match for 44,000, in a fair Field of Battle: But the natural Fire and Impetuoſity of the *French* prevailed; and, perhaps, M. *Noailles* might have reckoned on the Rawneſs of the combined Troops, or more probably on that of the Generals. Be that as it will, the *French* charged firſt, and ſo furiouſly, that, had their Numbers equaled their Bravery and Conduct, it would probably have proved a fatal Action to the combined Forces.

'Tis allowed of all Hands, that the *French* behaved with great Gallantry, and with great Conduct, if their attacking at all, after they ſaw the whole combined Army drawn up in Order of Battle, be not an Error; I ſay, except the attacking at all be a Miſtake, there ſeems to have been no other on the *French* Side; for they took all the Advantages the Ground would admit of, charged and retir'd with the greateſt Regularity: In ſhort, every Motion of theirs ſhew'd conſummate Skill and Experience; but, on the other Hand, every Motion of the combined Army, during the whole Action, ſhewed Confuſion and Inexperience. The Troops, in general, beha-

ved ſo as to ſhew, that if the Command had equal'd their Reſolution, the *French* would have had ſufficient Reaſon to repent them of having attacked an Army almoſt double their Number. 'Tis true, ſome of the *E——ſh* Horſe did not behave as might have been expected from choſen Men, and the beſt paid, mounted and accoutred in *Europe*; but the Misfortune is imputed rather to Error in ſome ſuperior Officer, than the Subalterns or private Men. Error there was, and ſeems to have been general; for, from what we have here from the beſt Hands, the different Regiments or Corps, in the *B——h* Service eſpecially, were left to act as they pleaſed without any ſuperior Orders.

Before the Duke of *Aremberg* was wounded and forced to quit the Field, the *Auſtrians*, in the Centre, were drawn up with Skill; but after, they behaved ſo as to ſhew the Want of Command amongſt them, as well as throughout the reſt of the Army. 'Tis true the Artillery, particularly the *Hanoverian*, ſeem'd to be managed with Skill, owing, as we are inform'd, to the Experience of a *French* Engineer in that Service.

When I mention a general Miſconduct on the Day of Action, I would not be underſtood to reflect on the Conduct of any particular Commander in the combined Army. There was an Error, and a very groſs one; but, let the World charge it to Particulars, if it pleaſes; for my Part, 'tis a Task too invidious for me to

to take upon myſelf. Let me however ſay, that it can't be charged upon the *Great Prince*, who, on that important Day, diveſted himſelf of all Superiority and Rank, and contented himſelf with heading, as a private Colonel, a favourite *Hanoverian* Regiment on the Left.

How groſs ſoever the Miſtakes were in the Conduct of ſome Commanders, the Goodneſs of the Troops in the main, and great Odds of Number, obliged the *French* to retire; but they retreated in ſo good Order, that the combined Army had no great Stomach to purſue them. This Paſſiveneſs was certainly owing to Error in the Commanders, or Want of Appetite in the Troops; for, conſidering the Superiority of the combined Army, there was a fair Opportunity of deſtroying moſt of the *French* Detachment before they could repaſs the River, if there had been an early and vigorous Purſuit.

From this Inſtance, if there was no other, it is no bad preſumptive Proof, that the Loſs was pretty equal, or rather greater on the Side of the combined Army; but we have more authentick Proofs which put the Point beyond Diſpute, however the Partizans of each Side affect to leſſen and exaggerate. The *French* loſt more Officers, and particularly of Diſtinction, becauſe they had more to loſe; but as for Men in the general, 'tis computed by the Impartial, that the Loſs on the Side of the Combined was about 3,300 kill'd, and

2,500 on that of the *French*. The Priſoners on both Sides were pretty equal, except that the *French* had more Officers taken; and, as for Enſigns, Banners, and other Military Trifles, they were equally ſhared, but the *French* had the Advantage in poſſeſſing ſome of the Enemy's Cannon.

Upon the whole, to examine this Action ſtrictly, there ſeems to be no great Room for boaſting on either Side. In many Inſtances the Remaining on the Field of Battle is thought to be a Sign of Victory; and, was this to be an invariable Maxim, the combined Forces muſt be allowed to have had the Victory, it being certain that they remain'd, for ſome Hours after the Retreat of the Enemy, on the Field: But when we reflect how few Hours they ſtay'd, that, during their Stay, they were continually under Arms, tho' very heavy Rains fell, and that they march'd off before Day-light with ſo great Precipitation as to leave their Dead unburied, their Wounded, the beſt Part of their Baggage, and ſome of their Cannon behind them: I ſay, to conſider the Conduct of both Armies immediately after the Action, one is at a Loſs where to fix the Advantage; but if one conſiders the Conſequences, he cannot heſitate to beſtow it on the *French*, tho' they failed in a ſtrict Execution of their firſt Deſign, ſuppoſing it to have been the taking of the whole Baggage of the combined Forces, and falling on their Rear on their March.

If

If we are to judge by the Conſequences, the Advantage is certainly on the *French* Side: For, what was the View of marching ſo high as the *Mayn*? What was the View of ſecuring the Poſt, and encamping at *Aſchaffenbourg*? It was, or ought to have been, to facilitate the Junction of the *Auſtrians* in the *Upper Palatinate* with the combined Army. But how is this End anſwered? Far from making any Advantage of a Victory claimed at *Dettingen*, the combined Forces made a forced March of near * 26 *Engliſh* Miles, the next Day, from the Field of Battle to *Hanau*, and turned their Backs upon the Poſts on the *Mayn*, which it was intended to ſecure, in order to the Junction with Prince *Charles*, or Prince *Lobkowitz*, or both. If the Junction was not intended, I ſhould be glad to know what was intended; for it does not appear that there was any other View in marching up to the *Mayn*; but be the March of the combined Army ſo high as the *Mayn*, taken in this, or any other Light, 'tis plain, by their not ſecuring Proviſions, that they did not deſign to ſtay, or did not expect to be moleſted, much leſs attacked by the *French*.

To tell you then, my noble Friend, freely the Opinion here of the March of the combined Army ſo high as the *Mayn*, 'tis thought there was no Dread of an Attack from the *French*, unleſs there was an Attempt of paſſing the *Neckar*, which was never intended. It was thought the *French* would not oppoſe paſſing

* Five *German* Miles.

paſſing the *Mayn*, as having no Poſts upon it ſo tenable as ſome on the *Neckar*. In ſhort, it was thought that the combined Forces might parade on, and about the *Mayn*, till Affairs in the *Upper Palatinate* ſhould take ſuch a Turn, as ſhould oblige the Emperor to come to Terms with the Court of *Vienna*. Had then the *French* not been ſo uncivil, as to break thro' the parading pacifick Scheme, might not a certain great Prince have aſſumed the Glory of putting an End to the Troubles of *Germany* without Risk or Bloodſhed?

The glorious Scheme was certainly worthy of the great Perſonage 'tis aſcribed to; but who it was that was intruſted with the Execution of it, is not ſo clearly known. Nor is it amiſs, that the Publick does not know where to fix the Error of not ſecuring Proviſions for an Army, ſuppoſing it deſigned for Parade only. The *French* indeed, in their *Gazettes*, ſeem to give us ſome Light into this dark Affair of the Scarcity of Proviſions in the combined Army, by telling the World, that they had taken Priſoner the *Intendant* of the combined Army. As this happened many Days before the Action at *Dettingen*, we are to ſuppoſe that the Scarcity was owing to the Misfortunes of that Gentleman; but who he was, or whether *Engliſh* or *Hanoverian*, is not come to my Knowledge; nor will you, I flatter myſelf, look upon it as any Diſreſpect for you, that I have neglected

neglected being informed of every Particular concerning an Affair of ſo little Importance. You will, I hope, think it ſufficient to know, that no Care was taken of providing for the Army, without troubling yourſelf about the Author of a Neglect that had like to prove fatal to Thouſands.

If this groſs Neglect of marching a great Army without ſecuring Proviſions has not been attended with more fatal Conſequences, let us impute it to Chance on one Hand, and Miſtake, or Fatality on the *French* Side, on the other: For let us ſuppoſe that the Confuſion had permitted the combined Army to have moved off from *Aſchaffenbourg* at *Eleven* at Night, as it was intended, the Conſequence would inevitably be, that the *French* Detachment would come up in Time to fall upon their Rear, and take all the Baggage, without it being poſſible for the Van, or Groſs of the combined Army, to prevent the Deſtruction of their Rear. But as the Affair happend, aſſiſted by Chance, what was it but fatal Error on the *French* Side, which prevented the intire Diſtruction of the combined Army; and what would be of infinitely worſe Conſequence, the taking one of the greateſt Princes in the World Priſoner?

Perhaps you may wonder at this Strain of Reaſoning, but I can aſſure you, that 'tis the Opinion of the moſt experienced Officers here, that the combined Army might have been ſo hem'd in by M. *Noailles*, that few could eſcape,

cape, had he taken his Meaſures right. 'Tis believed that General had 70,000 regular Troops in his Army. Had he then watch'd to have march'd over half his Forces at *Aſchaffenbourg*, as ſoon as the Poſt was abandoned by the combined Army; for ſo wholly and precipitately was that important Poſt abandoned, that the Country came in to pillage the heavy Baggage that was left quite unguarded; I ſay, if M. *Noailles* had march'd half his Army, inſtead of 23,000, over his Bridges below, and the other half over at *Aſchaffenbourg* above, might he not have hem'd in the combined Army, ſo as to ſtarve them effectually, or oblige them to ſurrender; or oblige them to make two Fronts, and fight upon very unequal Terms?

Such might have been the fatal Conſequences of marching ſo high as *Aſchaffenbourg*, without ſecuring the free Navigation of the *Mayn*, or otherwiſe providing for the Subſiſtence of the Army. But let us admire the Mercies of God, who inviſibly works the Safety of his Creatures againſt all the Maxims of Reaſon, or even Probability. Let us not however always preſumptuouſly reckon upon his Care of us, unleſs we correſpond by acting upon the Principles of Reaſon, and according to the Lights held out to us by Experience.

'Tis as certain, that *Want* obliged the combined Army to riſe up precipitately from *Aſchaffenbourg*, as that their Want would be increaſed,

increaſed, if the 12,000 *Hanoverians* and *Heſſians*, on their March to the Army, had join'd before they broke up. Therefore the wiſeſt Step that could be taken, was to tread back the ſame Ground they came: But you have ſeen how fatal even that wiſeſt Step might have proved, had the *French* made the moſt of their Advantage.

'Tis hard to know why M. *Noailles* did not make uſe of his whole Power when he determin'd to act offenſively; but be his Motive what it will, 'tis ſcarce dubious that he might have ruined the combined Army, if he had made the moſt of the Diſadvantages they lay under, and had brought upon themſelves: But why ſhall we wonder that one Man ſhould err, when we ſee ſuch groſs Errors committed by Numbers on the other Side. M. *Noailles* was this one General, but there were four principal Commanders in the combined Army, of equal Years at leaſt, if not of equal Experience with the *French* Marſhal. If he did not ſucceed literally in his Deſign of paſſing the *Mayn*, it may be ſaid he did virtually, ſince the combined Army quitted the Banks of the River, and retired from that important Spot where it was intended to wait for Prince *Charles*, or Prince *Lobkowitz*: But in no Senſe can it be urged in Favour of the Commanders of the combined Army, that they ſucceeded in any one Point they might have had in View,

except it was to make a Figure in *Germany*, and acquire Military Knowledge.

The Operations on the *Mayn* had no manner of Effect on the Deliberations of his Imperial Majeſty, with regard to the ſeparating his Troops from the *French* in the upper *Palatinate*; that Step was entirely owing to the Reſolutions of the *Diet*, to procure him a ſafe and reaſonable Peace, or arm the Empire in his Favour. It was this wiſe and important Reſolution which determined the Emperor to liſten to *France*, who had projected this ſalutary Scheme for ſecuring the Houſe of *Bavaria* againſt the Ambition of the Court of *Vienna*, and for retiring her Army under M. *Broglio* towards her own Confines, the better to cover herſelf from any Attempts that might be made in Conſequence of a late offenſive Alliance ſuppoſed to be contracted by the Queen of *Hungary* and her Auxiliaries.

I have already mentioned ſuch an Alliance, on a Suppoſition, that M. *Noailles* would not have attacked the combined Army, unleſs he had Orders to endeavour the Deſtruction of Troops that would ſoon be employ'd againſt her ſingly: But without ſeeking the Reality of ſuch an offenſive Alliance for the Conduct of the *French* General, may it not be found in the Conduct of the Generals of the combined Army? or, rather, may it not be ſeen by the Conduct of the Courts of *L*—— and *Vienna*, and by the indefatigable Solicitations of the *B*——*h* and *Hungarian* Miniſters at the *Hague*, and

and at all the Courts of the Empire? Either there is actually ſuch an Alliance, or I will boldly determine, that the Conduct of the Auxiliaries of *Hungary* is without Meaning or Deſign, except that of making a Figure, and creating a vaſt Expence. We will take this Matter higher than the March of the combined Army to the *Mayn*, or even beyond the *Rhine* from the *Netherlands*.

Before the End of the laſt Year, 'tis notorious that *France* had found Means, both at *Vienna* and the *Hague*, to have it propoſed that the Emperor would willingly liſten to Peace on the Footing of *uti poſſidetis*. Matters were carried on ſo far as that the *States General* were preſſed to offer their Mediation; and why that wiſe, cool People would refuſe accepting the Offer of ſo ſeaſonable and neceſſary a Mediation, is what I could never hear accounted for. The *States*, about that Time eſpecially, were the only proper Mediators that could be thought of in *Europe*; for, 'till ſome Months after, they did not come into any ſanguine Reſolutions in Favour of the Queen of *Hungary*.

Here then might the Broils of *Germany* ceaſe, if the *States General* had accepted the Mediation, and ſhew'd a becoming Firmneſs; or if the Ambition, or Self-love, or Obſtinacy, or Weakneſs, one don't know what to call it, of the Court of *Vienna*, had not ſtood in the Way. I know 'tis urged in Behalf of the Queen of *Hungary*, that ſhe was influenced

by the Court of *L*——. Some Excuſe is better than owning a devouring Ambition; but this is a very lame one, and, I may ſay, a very improbable Excuſe, at leaſt would be thought ſo by all who ſhould conſider the Intereſt of *England* only.

It could never be for the Intereſt of *England* to have the War continue. In no Senſe can a War on the Continent be of Advantage to that powerful Iſland; but a War in which it muſt neceſſarily take Part, ſhould it continue, is of all others the moſt pernicious to that Kingdom: The War between the Emperor and Queen of *Hungary* would neceſſarily become general, in which Caſe *England* muſt become a Party; and as all Wars on the Continent muſt be deſtructive to that Inſular Trading Nation, therefore it could never be the Court of *L*—— that had influenced that of *Vienna* to reject with Haughtineſs the Offers of Peace continually made to her all the laſt Winter, and before, on the Footing of *uti poſſidetis*: For, what was the natural Intereſt of *England*? What ought her Views to be?

The true Intereſt of *England* was to ſupport the Pragmatic Sanction, in order to balance the growing Power of the Houſe of *Bourbon*; but in looking on whilſt *Sileſia*, the faireſt Flower of the *Auſtrian* Inheritance, was torn from the Queen of *Hungary*, ſhe ſacrificed in part that true Intereſt. Suppoſing then *England* ſenſible of her Error, in not exerting herſelf as early as ſhe might in Favour of the Heireſs

of

of *Auſtria*, could ſhe hope to retrieve her Miſtake by adviſing the Queen of *Hungary* to continue the War? Impoſſible; becauſe the Continuance of the War could not, in all human Probability, better the Circumſtances of the Heireſs of *Auſtria*, and it might very likely render them much worſe.

By continuing the War, the Court of *Vienna* muſt have had the Conqueſt and Detention of *Bavaria* in View, or that of *Lorrain* or *Alſace*, or *French Flanders*; let us examine theſe Views. The Princes of *Germany*, and particularly the King of *Pruſſia* would not, nay, could not, without risking his own Safety, ſee an Elector ſtript of his Dominions, and an Emperor reduced to the loweſt Impotence and Beggary: Therefore as an Attempt to annex *Bavaria* to the *Auſtrian* Dominions would neceſſarily bring the whole Empire on the Back of the Queen of *Hungary*, ſhe could never intend to make herſelf whole for the Loſs of *Sileſia* at the Expence of the Houſe of *Bavaria*. Therefore the Conqueſt of *Bavaria* could not be her View for continuing the War, after ſhe might have obtained a Peace on the Footing *of each Party to remain with what he poſſeſſed before the Death of the late Emperor*.—Let us examine the probable Conſequences of continuing the War in order to conquer *Alſace* or *Lorrain*.

To wave all Diſcuſſion of the Injuſtice of an Attempt to wreſt Countries from any Power that poſſeſſes them in Virtue of ſolemn

lemn Treaties, which is the Caſe of *France* with regard to theſe Provinces, let us conſider the Inability of the Queen of *Hungary*, even ſuppoſing her ſupported by the whole Power of *England*; to maintain an offenſive War againſt ſo potent a Crown as that of *France*: But you will ſay, perhaps, that ſhe may be join'd by other Allies; and that by forming ſuch an Alliance as we ſaw in the late Queen *Ann*'s Days, *France* may be reduced to the loweſt Ebb. I don't ſay but ſuch another Alliance would have a Chance of humbling *France*; but I inſiſt upon it, that ſuch an Alliance at preſent is not practicable; and was it, that the Members of the old grand Alliance are not now in ſo happy a Situation as formerly, not excepting *England* and *Holland*; the Life and Spirit, as well as ſupport of all ſuch Alliances.

But the Impracticability of ſuch an Alliance as the laſt was, evidently appears from the Intereſt and Situation of the principal Powers of *Europe*. It would not be the Intereſt of any Prince in *Germany*, and leſs of the King of *Pruſſia* than any, that the Queen of *Hungary* ſhould by any new Acquiſitions become more powerful; therefore it is indiſputably true, that no Power in *Germany*, even not excepting *H——r*, would become a Party to ſuch an Alliance. They may hire out their Troops; but who, except *England* and *Holland*, would be in Circumſtance to pay them? or, indeed, How could even the *Auſtrian*

*trian* Troops be ſupported far from home, but by the Treaſure of the Maritime Powers? For it is no Secret, that if the Queen of *Hungary* had not been exhauſted as ſhe is by the preſent War, ſhe never was, nor could be monied enough to maintain great Armies far from home. The only Powers in *Europe* that can poſſibly do this, are *France*, *Spain* and the *Maritime*: And in a War on her own Borders, *France* would have greatly the Advantage.

It being then out of all Diſpute that no Prince of *Germany* would involve himſelf to aggrandize the Queen of *Hungary*, we muſt ſeek for more remote Allies in the *North*: But too truly it may be ſaid, that ſhe could hope for none in that Part of the Globe. *Ruſſia* and *Sweden* are too unſettled at home, and like to be ſo, for to hope that they would embark in a War from which they could not poſſibly hope for Advantage: And tho' *Denmark* be in leſs Apprehenſion of inteſtine Commotions, we may be aſſured, that its King has not the Will to break with *France*; and that, tho' he ſhould, he has not the Power to affect her any otherwiſe than by lending his Troops to thoſe who may bid higheſt for them.—Here, again, we ſhall be obliged to have Recourſe to the maritime Powers for paying the Piper, it being certain, that her *Hungarian* Majeſty, with all her pompous Titles, can ſcarce find Roſin for her own Fiddle.

We

We are at laſt come down to the only Power, except *England*, who is ſuppoſed to encourage the Continuance of the War, that could be an uſeful Ally to the warlike Queen in her Views of Conqueſt. This Power is *Holland*; but, for many Reaſons, I can't bring myſelf to a Belief that that wiſe Republick would risk the being plung'd into a general War, for any Conſideration leſs than an Invaſion of their Barrier, or ſome other Part of the *Auſtrian Netherlands*.

For how willing ſoever ſhe may be to keep fair with, and even gratify *England*, I don't think that any Aſſault of that Crown could ſhake her pacifick Reſolution. As Self-Intereſt is the predominant Paſſion of moſt Nations, but particularly of the *Dutch*, I won't doubt they would join againſt *France*, if they could hope to acquire any Benefit by ſo doing: But where there is ſcarce a Chance of getting, and a Probability of loſing, I ſhall never ſuppoſe that a *Dutchman* will risk his Butter and Cheeſe. I am not however ſo ſure that they would not be glad to ſee their good Proteſtant Neighbours, the *Engliſh*, at Cuffs with the *French*, becauſe then might they ingroſs the Trade of the World: And I would not ſwear but that they had ſome View of this kind, when they lately came into a Reſolution of marching 20,000 of their Troops to join the combined Army on the *Mayn*. Should there be any Truth in this Conjecture, which, I own, is not altogether

founded

founded on the Maxims of Charity, we may eaſily account for the *States General*'s refuſing the Mediation, tho' preſs'd to it for many Months, and with the greateſt Earneſtneſs by *France*. The plodding *Dutch* find the Sweets of the preſent impolitic War between *England* and *Spain*; but could they keep themſelves neuter in one with *France*, how would the lucrative Scene extend itſelf and brighten?

On this ſelf-intereſted Foundation one may build many Suppoſitions that would not redound much to the Honour of the Republic; but I chuſe rather to think, that ſhe has ſhaped her Conduct ſo as to encourage the Queen of *Hungary* without breaking with *France*, on a Suppoſition that the Balance of Power will be the ſafer by the Continuance of the War, inaſmuch as theſe Catholic Powers muſt neceſſarily exhauſt and impare their Strength: But I hold this Notion to claſh with the Maxims of ſound Policy: For if *France* alone were to be impoveriſhed, it might be prudent to prolong the War; but as Matters ſtand at preſent, *Auſtria*, or rather *England*, her Nurſe, drops Ducat for Ducat with *France*, if not two to one, now that ſhe is, or is ſoon like to be, eaſed of the Burden of ſupporting her own and the Imperial Troops in *Bavaria* and *Bohemia*.

If then *France* falls into a Conſumption, ſo muſt *England*; and as from the Nature of her Government, the great Parcimony of her

Inhabitants, and the Fertility of her Soil, it is likely ſhe will be able to retrieve herſelf ſooner than *England*, I can't diſcern the Policy of feeding a Flame that probably will burn Friend and Foe equally; or rather, the firſt more and ſooner than the latter.

But, on a Suppoſition that the *Dutch* have had no other View by their Augmentations, than to guard againſt Events; nor by their Succours, either of Troops or Money, to the Queen of *Hungary*, but to fulfil their Engagements, tho' I cannot arraign their Juſtice, I can't ſo readily gain upon myſelf to applaud their Wiſdom. The different Augmentations of their Troops, and their Subſidies to the Queen of *Hungary*, have been very expenſive; but had they, in the Beginning, ſhew'd a firm Willingneſs to maintain Peace in the Empire, *England* muſt have joined them, tho' unwilling, in thoſe early Days, in Tenderneſs to *H——r*, and *France* and *Pruſſia* would then be very cautious how they would interrupt the *Germanic* Tranquility. Thus might the Republic, without Expence or Bloodſhed, have preſerved the Peace of the Empire, and the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

It is true, the Form and Nature of the *Dutch* Government won't admit of ſo great Expedition in their Deliberations, on ſome Points, as may be expedient, and ſometimes neceſſary: But in the preſent Caſe, it was not neceſſary to conſult the different Provinces

and

and Towns; a ſteady Repreſentation from the *States General* to the ſeveral Courts intereſted, muſt neceſſarily have produced a Congreſs, rather than a War, for determining the Claims of the Houſes of *Bavaria* and *Brandenbourg* to that of *Auſtria*; but the critical Hour is long ſince elapſed on which the *States* might have commanded Peace: And tho' it be probable that they repent them of having ſlipt it, I am ſorry they don't ſeem inclin'd to an Amendment of their Fault, by inſiſting at preſent that the Queen of *Hungary* ſhould liſten to thoſe reaſonable Propoſals of Peace that have been offer'd her by the Emperor and *France*.

But tho' the *Dutch* have all along too cautiouſly avoided the Office of Mediators, yet I will not ſuppoſe that their Caution proceeded from any Deſign they had form'd of breaking with *France*: For, beſides, that *Holland* can't well hope to reap any Benefit by a Breach with that Crown, and that on the contrary, a War in *Flanders*, which would be inevitable in caſe of a Rupture, might be productive of Conſequences injurious to the United Provinces; I ſay, beſides theſe Reaſons, alone ſufficient to outweigh all the Solicitations of the Courts of *London* and *Vienna*, there are many others which ſhould determine a wiſe State to adhere to the pacifick Maxims ſhe has long obſerved.

The States are engaged by no Treaties, unleſs it be very lately and ſecretly, to gratify

the Pride, Reſentment, or Ambition of the Queen of *Hungary*, or any other Power, by acting offenſively againſt *France* in order for Conqueſt; but if there had been any Engagement of this Nature entered into, it would be far better evaded than fulfilled, as being contrary to Religion and Humanity, and of Courſe to all that might be expected from a wiſe and moderate Republick. Reputation to a State is like Credit to a private Adventurer or Banker. A State ſhould be no leſs cautious of risking its Honour and Reputation, than the Merchant his Credit; for how rich ſoever the Adventurer, he is ſoon unhinged if he loſes his Credit; and how powerful ſoever the State, it loſes half its Weight and Influence, if it loſes its Reputation, or forfeits its Honour. On this Foundation then, I ſay, 'tis improbable that *Holland* ſhould risk the loſing ſo valuable a Thing as Reputation, to gratify peeviſh or ambitious Powers.

But to conſider the Incumbrances and preſent Circumſtances of the *Dutch*, there is ſcarce a Probability that they will dance after the Fiddle of more wanton Powers. Wanton, did I ſay, which expreſſes Affluence and Repletion! Where is the Power now in *Europe*, who is, or has any Right to be wanton in this Senſe, except the King of *Portugal* and State of *Venice*, who have been long idle Spectators of the Calamities of the reſt of *Europe*? The Epithet *Wanton* would very improperly be applied

applied to the Queen of *Hungary*, who is ſo enfeebled as to be obliged to lean heavily on the Shoulders of others. It would become *England* very little better, which, beſides owing 50 Millions *Sterling* of her old Incumbrances, is taxed up to the Height, and in a galloping Conſumption with regard to her Trade and Induſtry.

But let me recollect; If *England* have no Pretence to *Wantonneſs*, may not her younger Siſter of *Hanover* put in her Claim? If the Coffers of *England* be drain'd, are not thoſe of her Siſter's repleniſh'd? If the Blood be drawn from the Vitals of the one, is it not politically injected into the Veſſels of the other? Tho' *England* be indebted, has not *H——r* made conſiderable Purchaſes? We are not now examining the Coin in which the Purchaſe-Money was paid. If the Subjects of *England* be tax'd beyond their Strength, are not thoſe of the E———te cheriſh'd and eaſed? Are they not of the Number of the Elect who are to be ſaved, whilſt their Inſular Brethren are doom'd to be ———?

To conſider then every Circumſtance of *H——r*; if we can't call it the Land of Promiſe, becauſe of its Barrenneſs, we may very properly that of *Wantonneſs*. This then, and not *England*, is that *wanton* Power, after whoſe Fiddle *Holland* may be obliged to dance: And why not as well as a *more powerful State*, that has jigg'd to it all round *Europe*, for near thirty Years paſt.

This

This State, however emaciated by her many expenſive Frolicks of late Years, is not ſo ſick of her Diverſions, but that ſhe ſeems inclined to lead up a grand Dance, tho' 'tis Odds but ſhe is left by the whole Company to pay the Muſick.

To quit the ludicrous for the ſerious Stile, What can *England* mean by her preſent Conduct? Does ſhe hope to pay off her Debts, recover her Trade and better her Condition, by an expenſive War on the Continent? Perhaps ſhe may hope to aggrandize the Houſe of *Auſtria* at the Expence of *France*, and ſo wreſt the Balance of Power from that ambitious Crown; or, more likely, ſhe may intend to fix her Standards once more again on the Banks of the *Garronne*, the *Loire* and the *Senne*. There is nothing which a reſenting, powerful, unincumber'd Nation, with a warlike Prince at their Head, may not attempt and ſucceed in: But, tho' we ſhan't go about denying that People Power, nor their Monarch all Moral and Military Virtues; yet, in my humble Opinion, they are not at this Time a Match for *France*; nor do I think, if they were, that it would be their Intereſt to ſubdue that Kingdom if they could do it. Indeed, were they ſure that the future Princes of the preſent Royal Line would have the *Amor Patriæ* as ſtrong upon them as his late Majeſty and ——— they need not apprehend that the Conqueſt of *France* would prove injurious to *England:* But unleſs they cou'd ſecure

cure the Affections of their future Monarchs, I don't think they ought to risk the becoming *Bankers* to *France*, as they have been for many Years, to a far more deſpicable Land. It is the *Intereſt* of this favour'd *Land*, tho' an Intereſt that claſhes with their own, which at preſent ſeems to incline the *Engliſh* Nation, and to direct all their Councils and Meaſures.——Let us examine theſe different Intereſts ſeparately, to ſee if we can fathom the preſent myſterious Depth of *Engliſh* Politicks.

We have obſerved, that it would have been the Intereſt of *England* to give an early and vigorous Support to the Heireſs of *Auſtria*, as ſoon as the Intentions of *Pruſſia* and *Bavaria* were known. It was equally the Intereſt of *Holland* to act in Conformity; but the ſeparate *Intereſt* of *H——r*, tied up *England*, which being ſo perceivable by all *Europe*, and by *Holland* in particular, that ſhe thought it more prudent to lie by, than raiſe herſelf Enemies, whom ſhe alone was unable to withſtand: But it may be naturally ask'd, how it was the Intereſt of the favour'd *Land* to ſtay the Motions of *England*, and conſequently of *Holland*, in Favour of the Queen of *Hungary?* You who are no Stranger to the envious Jealouſy conceived in *Germany* of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, will not need a minute Diſcuſſion of this Point: But beſides this Reaſon, though weighty in this Part of *Europe*, there were others no leſs cogent.

By

By permitting the Flame of War to ſpread, there would be Room for being courted by both Sides, and conſequently a Chance of having the Power of obliging one of the Parties, ſo as to induce him to guaranty the dear E———e. This Part of the Scheme, you ſee, has ſucceeded: For the late Treaty between *Pr—-a* and *E——d*, which ſeems to have no Object but the Guaranty of *H—r*, had never taken Place, if *England* had vigorouſly ſuccour'd the Queen of *Hungary* in Time. Inſtead of a Guarantee, that neighbouring Prince would become an implacable Enemy, had *England* thwarted his Deſigns upon *Sileſia*: 'Tis true that his being an Enemy to *England*, would be of very little or no Conſequence; but the Caſe was quite otherwiſe with *H——r*.

With reſpect to the real Intereſt of *England*, the Enmity or Friendſhip of *Pr—-a* is equally indifferent. *England* can have no lucrative Views in contracting Alliances with inland States; nor has ſhe any Reaſon to dread their Reſentment, while ſhe purſues her true Intereſt; yet to conſider the late defenſive Alliance between their Majeſties of *B——n* and *Pr—-a*, and the Solemnity with which that Treaty was uſher'd to the World, one would be apt to think, that *England* was unable to ſubſiſt without the great Power of *Pr—-a*; one may look upon that Treaty as a Key to the preſent Politicks of the Cabinet of *L——n*. It is a reciprocal Guaranty of the

the ſeveral *Poſſeſſions* of the high Contractors in *Europe*. This laſt *Word* was prudently inſerted, for fear his *Pruſſian* Majeſty ſhould be call'd upon to aſſiſt with his *Navy* againſt *Spain* in *America*. Ha, ha!

But what are thoſe *Poſſeſſions* belonging to his *B——k* Majeſty, as King, that require the Guaranty of a Prince, who has not one Ship in the World? But the Scene quickly ſhifts, if his Majeſty be conſidered in his *Electoral* Capacity. His Dominions in *Germany* ſurely are in *Europe*, and conſequently come within the ſpiritual, and even the literal Senſe of the Words of the Treaty. On the other Hand, there is no doubt that *Sileſia*, that is, that Part of it torn from the Queen of *Hungary*, is likewiſe in *Europe*; ſo that in Virtue of a Treaty, which to vulgar Eyes ſeems of no manner of Advantage to *England*, ſhe may hereafter not a little involve herſelf, by being obliged to ſend her *Guineas*, and dance her Troops much farther off than either *Dettingen* or *Hanau*.

I have often heard it ſaid, that there is a Clauſe in the Act of Settlement, which reſtrains *England* from incurring any Expence, or otherwiſe involving herſelf on Account of *H——r*. I won't anſwer that ſuch a Clauſe ſubſiſts unrepeal'd; but if there be, I wonder what *E——h* Miniſter would venture to ſet his Hand to any Treaty, which directly engages their Country in a Guaranty that probably will be attended with great Ex-

pence and Perplexity; and which, in every Senſe, muſt be calculated for *H——r*, and in no Senſe, can be of Benefit to *England*: I had almoſt ſaid, that that Treaty is not ſo much as relative to it.

If there be no ſuch Clauſe, there is no poſitive Law to convict by, and conſequently all is ſafe as to particular Perſons: But where is the *Amor Patriæ* all this while? All we ſhall ſay, is, that this glorious Virtue ſeems, amongſt certain Miniſters, to be ſunk into Flattery and Servility; and, that in a *certain Country*, they want for nothing more than *Honeſty*, or ſome one very good Law to enforce the Obſervation of all the good Laws they already have.

But if it was the Intereſt of *H——r* not to give early Succour to the Queen of *Hungary*, how comes it, you'll ſay, to be the Intereſt of that E———e, to ſupport her at preſent, at an enormous Expence? I need not tell you, that the Expence is *England*'s, and not *H——r*'s, nor that the Emoluments of the latter ariſe from the Out-goings of the former. This is very diſtinguiſhable at all Times, but particularly at preſent, when ſo many of her Troops are in the *Engliſh* Pay, upon better Terms than uſual. Therefore, we are not to wonder, that *England* is leured to play an After-Game, tho' a very bad one, if her Expences center principally, where 'tis thought there is already no Want of *Engliſh* Guineas and Crown-Pieces: But there may be

be other Motives no leſs important for this ſeeming, but expenſive Concern for that injured Princeſs.

The *Engliſh* are ſaid to be a murmuring, ſtubborn People, tenacious of Liberty, in Appearance at leaſt; nor are they counted leſs headſtrong than unſteady. They ſeem'd, for ſome Years paſt, to wear the Face of Uneaſineſs at leaſt, if not Diſcontent, on Account of the too great *Servility*, as they call'd it, of their late Miniſter. He was, 'tis true, ſervile to Exceſs, if Servility conſiſts in abſolute Obedience on one Hand, and a deep Concern for the Intereſt of the E——e, on the other: But are his Succeſſors leſs ſervile, tho' their Meaſures ſeem to be very different? The late Miniſter's Scheme was Peace, theirs is War? But are the latter leſs influenc'd by the Intereſt of *H*——, than the firſt? Not at all. The late M——r preſerved Peace by falling in implicitly with all the Views of *France*, which tended to weaken the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and the preſent M——rs go into a War, ſeemingly at leaſt, to raiſe that Houſe; a Work which they very well know to be above their Strength. Are not theſe, as much as he was, Drudges to the *H*———*n* Intereſt? It was one of the *H*———*n* Maxims, as it is of all the States of *Germany*, to reduce the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The late M——r wrought upon this Maxim and ſucceeded. It is no leſs the Maxim with *H*——*r*, and the other States of the Em-

pire, to keep that Houſe low, when once it is fallen. If the preſent M——rs did not ſtrictly adhere to this Maxim, would they have obſtructed Peace between the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*, almoſt upon her own Terms, ever ſince the Siege of *Prague?*

The Emperor very ſincerely ſought Peace, and would have purchaſed it at the Expence of giving up his Claims, and contenting himſelf with his own Patrimony; *France* was as ſincere, and more earneſt than the Emperor for Peace. What could the Queen deſire more? Tho' ſhe had loſt *Sileſia*, one of the Supports (or Legs as *Germans* call them) of her Houſe to *Pruſſia*, by the Peace, ſhe ſecured for ever the other; *Bohemia* is this other Buttreſs that ſupports the Houſe of *Auſtria*, which, together with its other Dominions in *Germany*, renders it ſtill obnoxious to many Powers in the Empire. Therefore, if the Queen, buoy'd up with the vain Hopes of Conqueſt, was prevailed upon to reject all reaſonable Overtures of Peace, won't it be ſuggeſted that it was with a View of weak'ning, rather than ſtrength'ning the Houſe of *Auſtria?* I have already ſhewn, that all the Queen's Hopes of Conqueſt are imaginary and vain; therefore, to ſooth her to continue a ruinous War, which drains her and her Subjects, when ſhe might have had a good Peace, can be with no View but to weaken her purſuant to *H———n* Maxims of Policy.

If the late M——r did ſteer by the *H*——a Compaſs in all his Schemes of Peace, is it not obvious, that the preſent ſhape their Courſe alſo by the ſame Compaſs in all their Schemes of War? But ſuppoſing neither had any Biaſs towards the Intereſt of their own Country; at leaſt, let us ſay, that the pacifick Scheme was better ſuited to the Intereſt of a trading People, than the warlike.

The Diſcontent of the Nation at the late Miniſtry, laid the preſent under a Neceſſity of varying the Plan of Operation; and there was not ſcarce any other Alternative but War. This Plan then was purſued becauſe it would anſwer ſeveral domeſtick as well as foreign Purpoſes: Shall I need to enumerate Purpoſes ſo evident and well known?

War anſwered the Purpoſes of the E——e, by the Pay of her Troops, the Preſence of the Sovereign, always attended with Benefit; and by weak'ning the Houſe of *Auſtria*, that conſtant Eye-ſore, as has been before obſerved. War anſwered no leſs domeſtick Purpoſes. Court was neceſſarily to be made by new Servants, that in a Manner forced themſelves upon a Maſter; and how could it be done more effectually, than by gratifying all predominant Paſſions? A martial Genius is as pleaſed with War, as the M——r with G——ld.

But this is not all neither, tho' a very eſſential Benefit: The People love Buſtle and Noiſe; are pleaſed with Encampments and Embarka-

Embarkations; and, above all, hate the *French* from Nature. War then, eſpecially againſt *France*, anſwers every Purpoſe of pleaſing as well as fleecing the People: And it anſwers likewiſe the Purpoſe of keeping them quiet and tame, if they ſhould not be pleaſed. If to theſe, and many other Motives, it be added, that Miniſters always find their private Account in every Increaſe of the national Expence, why ſhould it be wondered that *England* makes this terrible Figure at preſent on the Continent, as well as Sea?

That Nation, tho' really powerful and brave, generally ſet out with more Buſtle and Noiſe; or, in other Words, more terribly than any other People; and more ſo than a wiſe Nation would care to do; becauſe, when Men ſet out modeſtly, a Miſcarriage is leſs mortifying and more excuſable. How mortifying is it to ſee a Nation that talk'd of nothing leſs three Years ago, than conquering the whole *Spaniſh Indies*, ſquander away Millions, loſe Thirty Thouſand Men, and many of their beſt Ships of War, and yet be no farther advanced than the firſt Day of the War? How mortifying would it be, if after ſo exorbitant an Expence as this ſame Nation has been already at, and ſo great Buſtle and Noiſe as they have made to conquer for the Queen of *Hungary*, they ſhould ſneakingly come off with a worſe Peace for her than ſhe might have had Six or Ten Months

Months ago? If they have had no better Succeſs againſt *Spain*, an impotent Power, on their own Element, the Sea, what Hopes can they have of ſucceeding in a diſtant Land War againſt *France*, the powerfulleſt Nation in the World, and the beſt skill'd in that Sort of War?

The Odds againſt the *Engliſh* in a Land War with *France*, and the Improbability of their ſucceeding without Allies, or with ſuch as there is any Probability of their engaging, are ſuch forcible Reaſons as muſt induce a Man, of ever ſo little Penetration, to ſuppoſe they never intended to be in Earneſt, whatever they may do to appear ſo, in order to anſwer thoſe Purpoſes before-mentioned: But ſhould they happen to be intangled in a Web of their own weaving, and catch a Tartar by carrying the Jeſt too far, how unlamented would they be, by thoſe who wiſh'd them beſt before; how ridiculed by all the World?

If *France* can win ſo far on the King of *Pr——a*, as to remain neuter in caſe of an offenſive War againſt her, I ſhould be very apt to ſuſpect ſhe would wiſh ſuch a War begun, even tho' the *Dutch* became her Enemies: And I am not without ſome Dread, that the late Action at *Dettingen* was an Erneſt of her Diſpoſition towards a War. All her Expence of Blood and Treaſure hitherto was for an Ally; but in ſuch a War as I am ſpeaking of, her own immediate Intereſt would

would be the ſole Object of her View: The *Netherlands* would neceſſarily become the the Theatre of War. There ſhe is ſtrongeſt; and there ſhe might, and probably would, puſh her Point in ſpite of the *Dutch* Barrier. This is the Point which *France* has had in View for near an Age; 'tis a Point the *Dutch* have moſt Reaſon to be very tender in regard to it. They riſk much in loſing an Inch in this Spot; but *France* can bear loſing a great deal without any real Danger.

Now ſhould the too refin'd Politics of the new *Engliſh* Miniſtry carry them ſo far as not to be able to retire without Loſs, or Risk at leaſt, as it happened to the Generals of the combined Army, by marching to *Aſcaffenbourg*, what Excuſe could they make to an injured, bubbled Nation? What Atonement can her Generals make for Miſtakes which have coſt very dear, were like to coſt much dearer, and may ſtill be attended with uncommon Conſequences?

We will ſuppoſe the Conqueſt of *Lorrain* to be the Scheme concerted between the Queen of *Hungary* and her potent Auxiliary; it is true, this would be one Way to compenſate that Princeſs for her Ceſſion of *Sileſia*: But with what Juſtice could the Conſort of that Princeſs agree to a Scheme attended with ſo notorious a Breach of Faith on his Side? At leaſt it would become him to reſtore the *Grand Dutchy*, infinitely more valuable in Point of Revenue. Should the

Conqueſt

Conqueſt of *Lorrain* be in View, let us no more hear the *German*, or rather the *Auſtrian* Faith boaſted of, nor the *Gallick* impeach'd.

But leaving Juſtice out of the Queſtion, as being a Virtue the leaſt regarded by moſt Princes, let us examine the Policy of the new *Engliſh* Miniſtry in adviſing an Attempt, which, if it ſhould not ſucceed, will be attended with Loſs and Infamy; and if it ſhould, can be attended with no Conſequence equivalent to the Expence. Suppoſing, after the Junction of Prince *Charles* of *Lorrain* and the *Dutch* to the combined Army, the *French* ſhould be obliged to give Way to the firſt Motions of ſo unequal a Force; ſuppoſing the combined Army in Poſſeſſion of *Lorrain*, muſt they not be ignorant of the Skill, the Power, and great Reſources of the *French* Nation, who can imagine they could long maintain the Poſſeſſion? *France* will never yield a ſingle Village by Treaty, until ſhe be drove to it by repeated ill Succeſs, after an Experience of a long and expenſive War; And who can ſupport ſuch a War againſt her? The Queen of *Hungary* is utterly unable to defray any, or but a very ſmall Proportion, of the Expence; the Princes of *Germany* will undoubtedly bear none at all; it is not their Intereſt that the Queen, or her Houſe, ſhould acquire additional Strength: Who then but *England* muſt ſupport ſuch an Expence as an Attempt upon *Lorrain* will

neceſſarily occaſion? As *France* will change the Scene of War to the *Netherlands*, I agree that *Holland* muſt be obliged to come in for a Share of the Expence; but it will be ſo unequal a Proportion, that one may venture to pronounce that *England* alone muſt neceſſarily be ſaddled with *Three Fifths*, at leaſt, of the Expence of a War, which can't coſt ſo little as ten Millions annually.

Well, but ſuppoſing *England* willing, I won't ſay able, becauſe of the great Weight of her Taxes and Incumbrances, to maintain ſuch a tedious War againſt *France* as we have mention'd, what Benefit could ſhe propoſe to herſelf, ſuppoſing *Lorrain*, and even *Alſace*, ſhould be torn from *France*? Would the Loſs of thoſe Provinces impair, much leſs deſtroy her *Trade*, which ought to be the ſole Object of *England* in her Wars upon that neighbouring Commercial Rival, or indeed on any other Nation? Her ſwerving from this ſalutary Maxim ever ſince the Revolution in 1688, has been attended with Conſequences very injurious to her genuine Intereſt.

If before now there had been any Want of Proof that the Intereſt of *E——d* was, and probably always will be ſacrificed to that of *H——r*, the preſent Conduct of the *E——h* Miniſtry would put the Matter out of Diſpute: For if the Deſign be to pull down *France*, I beg Leave to ſay, that *England* had a far nearer Way to it than attempting Conqueſts

on

on the *Rhine* and *Moſelle*. The *Engliſh* being at preſent potent at Sea, the firſt Step towards reducing *France* ſhould be to deſtroy her Trade, by ruining her Colonies, by the Capture of her trading Ships, and by making continual Deſcents on her Sea-Coaſts. To begin a War againſt *France* by Sea in ſuch a Manner as is here deſcribed, would have ſome Meaning; but to bear all or moſt of the Expence of a War on the Continent, as Auxiliaries only, ſeems to have neither Meaning or Deſign with regard to *England*. But may it not be otherwiſe with regard to the Intereſt of *H——r*, and the particular Intereſt of the new Miniſtry? You won't doubt it, if you reflect, as has been already obſerved, that *H——r*, by the Hire of her Troops, and the Preſence of her E——r, muſt always be a Gainer by *England*'s being deeply concern'd in a War on the Continent; that the new M——y make their Court by falling in with the Paſſions of ——; and that a Land-War furniſhes many more Occaſions for Miniſterial Jobs than one by Sea, which, one may ſay, is out of the Element of a S——y of S—te, or firſt Lord of the T——ry.

But why ſhould you or I employ our Care about a Nation that has long neglected her own natural Intereſt? Why ſhould we trouble ourſelves about Conſequences that can't, morally ſpeaking, affect us or our Country? *S——y* would be ſafe from the Waſte of ſuch

such a War as *England* seems to meditate; and unless it should spread to *A——a* and *S——n* might look on with Unconcern. A tender Father's Care has lately warded off the fatal Blow from a favourite Child, and would do so again if Occasion offered; but there is little Reason to fear that his Tenderness will be pushed too far. Should the War go on, both Sides will think it equally their Interest to court and manage our Royal Master. The Interest of *H——r* will always tye down *E——d*, particularly during the Life of the present ——, as it has lately in the memorable Neutrality seem'd to have been transacted by Captain *M——n* before *N——s*. *Dr——n* is too near *H——r* for our Master's having any Distaste or Cause given him in Matters that don't affect the immediate Interest of *H——r*.

But I forget that I ought not to make that a Toil, which I design'd as an Amusement. Let me then cut off here, by assuring you, that no one in the World can be more sincerely

*Yours, &c.*

*F I N I S.*